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SETTLING THROUGH CONSENT DECREE IN
PRISON REFORM LITIGATION: EXPLORING
THE EFFECTS OF RUFO V. INMATES OF
SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL
INTRODUCTION
The 1954 United States Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board
of Education' triggered an upsurge in institutional reform litigation. 2
In this type of litigation, parties sue the government or a public
institution to obtain injunctive relief against continuing statutory or
constitutional violations. 3 The courts, however, have encountered
problems and criticism in this area while effectuating change
through judicially imposed remedies. 4 In recent years, parties have
turned to consent decrees 5 as a means of resolving disputes against
I 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 758 (1992).
Institutional reform litigation is also referred to as structural reform litigation and
public law litigation. See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO.
L.J. 1355, 1357 (1991). Examples of this type of litigation include prison reform, school
desegregation, environmental conditions and electoral reapportionment. Id. For a general
discussion of institutional reform litigation, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. I (1979); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing
Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265.
4 See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact of Judicial Intervention on
Prisons and Jails: A Framework for Analysis and a Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS,
AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTICIN ON PRISONS AND JAILS 12,
16-42 ( John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990) (noting criticism of adjudicatory system in institutional
reform litigation and need for alternative means of dispute resolution in this area); Sturm,
supra note 2, at 1357, 1427-44 (noting that traditional adversarial methods are not adequate
in public law litigation and suggesting an alternative model of remedial decision making that
stresses a participatory process).
5
 A consent decree represents a formal settlement between two parties that is approved
by a judge. A consent decree is defined as follows:
[A] decree entered in an equity suit on consent of both parties; it is not properly
a judicial sentence, but is in the nature of a solemn contract or agreement of
the parties, made under the sanction of the court, and in effect an admission
by them that the decree is a just determination of their rights upon the real
facts of the case, if such facts had been proved. It binds only the consenting
parties; and is not binding upon the court.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 411 (6th ed. 1990).
For a general discussion of consent decrees, see Symposium, Consent Decrees: Practical
Problems and Legal Dilemmas, 1987 U. C111. LEGAL F. 1 (discussing the hybrid nature of consent
decrees as part contract and part judicial act); Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent
Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 725, 729-37 (1986) (discussing
structure and terms typically contained in a consent decree); Clark E. Walter, Consent Decrees
and the Judicial Function, 20 CATH. U. L. REv. 312, 315-27 (1970) (discussing use and benefits
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public institutions. 6 Consent decrees allow parties to avoid the high
cost and lengthy process of litigation by reaching a negotiated com-
promise embodied in the terms of the consent decree.' Consent
decrees conserve scarce judicial resources by promoting alternative
means of dispute resolution. 8 In addition, parties with expert knowl-
edge in the area can tailor terms to their satisfaction in a way that
a comparatively inexpert court could not.°
Consent decrees are especially prevalent in the area of prison
reform litigation.l° Currently, over thirty states are operating penal
facilities under consent decrees." These decrees often impose affir-
mative obligations on prison administrators to maintain population
caps and single-occupancy cells.' 2 Although these decrees represent
a bargained-for agreement between the parties that reflects con-
tractual obligations, they are future-oriented orders that are over-
seen and enforced by a federal judge." With the rampant rise in
of consent decrees in antitrust litigation); Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of
Compromise and Settlement, 72 l-IARV. L. REV. 1314, 1316-24 (1959) (discussing the enforcement
and judicial effect of consent decrees).
6 Settlement by consent decree occurs in many areas of institutional reform litigation.
See Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1020, 1020-21 (1986) [hereinafter Modification of Consent Decrees] (noting that plaintiffs have
employed consent decrees to resolve disputes over school desegregation, zoning, prison
conditions, discriminatory civil service exams, special education programs, toxic waste liti-
gation and public mental health institutions).
Settlement by consent decree is also widespread in areas other than institutional reform,
such as securities and antitrust litigation. See Timothy Stolzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and
Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1102-03 (1986)
(noting that in recent years over 70% of Justice Department antitrust cases and 90% of SEC
cases were resolved by consent decrees); Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1304-05 (1967) (noting that consent decrees in antitrust cases are
resolved more efficiently than litigated cases).
See Local 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 528 (1986); United
States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Center for
Dispute Settlement at 5, Kufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (No.
90-954).
8 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (No. 90-954).
9 Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1989).
to See LACY H. THORNBURG, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, NATIONAL PRISON
CONDITIONS LITIGATION SURVEY 4-13 (1991) [hereinafter PRISON SURVEY]; THE NATIONAL
PRISON PROJECT, STATUS REPORT: THE COURTS AND PRISONS 1 (1990) [hereinafter PRISON
PROJECT].
" PRISON PROJECT, supra note 10, at 2.
is See PRISON SURVEY, supra note 10, at 6. The Survey reports that out of 47 states, 14
are under mandates that impose population caps, and 9 states have orders prohibiting double
ceiling. Id.
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 757 (1992). A claimant seeking
relief from a consent decree must move for modification by filing a motion under rule
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inmate population over the last ten years," prison administrators
have found compliance with these decrees difficult and have fre-
quently sought modification by appealing to the courts.' 5
The United States Supreme Court first enunciated the standard
for modification of consent decrees in the 1932 case of United States
v. Swift & Co. 16 In Swift, the Court held that a party seeking modi-
fication must demonstrate "a clear showing of grievous wrong" in
order to modify a consent decree." In subsequent decades, the
Court avoided overruling Swift but drew from language of Swift
that recognized the nature of a consent decree as part contract and
part judicial act in order to grant modification in some cases.'s The
Court also distinguished Swift on its facts to grant modification in
other cases.' 9 Although the Supreme Court resisted overruling the
strict Swift standard, many circuit courts moved away from Swift in
recent years, adopting a more flexible standard for modification in
the area of institutional reform litigation. 20 These courts justified
the use of a more flexible standard by noting that the complex,
future-oriented nature of these decrees often adversely affects the
public interest as unforeseen impediments arise. 21
60(6)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which leaves the ultimate decision on
modification up to the judge's equitable discretion. Id. Rule 60(6)(5) states in pertinent part,
"the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for any of the following reasons ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application." FED. R. Civ. P. 60.
14 As of January I, 1991, 732,236 inmates were confined in state and federal prisons.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK: INSTANT ANSWERS TO KEY QUES-
TIONS IN CORRECTIONS I (1991). This represents an increase of 8.7% over the previous year.
Id,
15 See Prison Survey, supra note 10, at app. at B I I. The Survey reports that eight states
have sought modification of consent decrees in recent years. Id.; see also NORVAL MORRIS &
MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION 13-14 (1990) (noting prison administra-
tors' difficulty adhering to population caps).
15 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
° Id. at 119.
1 " See Local 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986); United
States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 (1975); United States v. Armour &
Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971).
1 " See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111  S. Ct. 630, 636-37 (1991); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1968).
" See, e.g., Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1110 (6th Cir, 1989); Badgely v. Santa-
croce, 853 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1988); Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208, 215 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 897; Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1520 (11th Cir. 1984); United
States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1359-60 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Philadelphia
Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1120-21 (3d Cir. 1979).
21 See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 969 (2d
Cir. 1983).
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Consent decrees also raise federalism problems when a federal
court is faced with the decision to either modify or enforce the
provisions of these decrees against state governments. 22 The Su-
preme Court has recently questioned the federal courts' continued
enforcement of equitable decrees as a potential encroachment on
state or local government autonomy in institutional reform litiga-
tion. 23 This problem is particularly acute in the area of prison
reform litigation, where the Court has often recognized that federal
courts must defer to local legislative and executive administrators
to respect state sovereignty and the principle of separation of pow-
ers.24 In light of the Court's recent trend toward cutting back on
judicial oversight of prison affairs, 25 many states have addressed
prison overcrowding themselves by exploring alternative sanctions
to incarceration. 26
In the 1992 case of Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County jail, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Swift standard for mod-
ification of consent decrees does not appl5, in institutional reform
litigation. 27 Rufo involved a consent decree signed in 1979 that
required, among other things, single-occupancy cells at the Suffolk
County Jail in Boston, Massachusetts. 28 The Suffolk County Sheriff
sought modification of the decree due to an unexpected rise in
inmate population, but the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts refused modification, relying in large part
on Swift. 29 The district court's decision was affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit." The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a more flex-
ible standard for modification of consent decrees was appropriate
in institutional reform litigation." The Court determined that the
Swift standard was not appropriate in institutional reform litigation
22 See Alan Effron, Note, Federalism and Federal Consent Decrees Against State Governmental
Entities, 88 CoLum. L. Rzv. 1796, 1808-10 (1988).
" See Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
2  See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 {1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827
1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
25 See Peter Keenan, Constitutional Law: The Supreme Court's Recent Battle Against Judicial
Oversight of Prison Affairs, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 507, 507-08 (1991).
26 See MORRIS Se TONRY, supra note 15, at 48-69.
27
 112 S. Ct. 748, 760 (1992).
2g Id. at 755.
" See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 565 (D. Mass. 1990)
(district court refused modification request under the Swift standard).
g°
 Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990).
si Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 111 S. Ct. 950 (1991).
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because these decrees must be open to fine-tuning as changed cir-
cumstances unfold. 32 The Court's new standard allows for modifi-
cation if the movant can demonstrate that a change in operative law
or factual circumstances has occurred that makes compliance oner-
ous." The Court cautioned, however, that the modification must be
"suitably tailored" to the changed circumstances to ensure that the
finality of the original agreement is preserved."
This Note will explore the problems courts have faced in insti-
tutional reform litigation when faced with requests for modification
of consent decrees. In particular, the Note focuses on the Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail decision and its potential effects on
consent decrees in the context of prison reform litigation. Section
I examines the evolution of the Supreme Court's consent decree
modification doctrine leading up to the Rufo case. 35 Section I focuses
specifically on the Court's consideration of the nature of consent
decrees36 as well as the federalism concerns that consent decrees
have engendered over the years. 37 Section II discusses the devel-
opment of a more flexible standard for consent decree modification
among the circuit courts and notes inconsistencies that emerged
among the circuits. 33 Section III focuses on the Rufo case itself and
examines the new flexible standard that the Court adopted." Sec-
tion IV suggests that the Court's new standard will invite prison
administrators nationwide to use the current prison overcrowding
crisis as a justification for modification of consent decrees that im-
pose population caps. 4° Section IV argues that this unfortunate
trend toward allowing modification in the prison context threatens
to undermine significant remedial changes parties have realized
through consent decrees and endangers the continued utility of
consent decrees as an important means of settlement. 4 ' Section V
focuses on the prison overcrowding problem in Massachusetts as a
case study representative of what is occurring in most other states,
and suggests that the legislature is largely responsible for the cur-
32 Rufo, 112 S. Ct at 758.
33 See id. at 760.
31 See id. at 763.
55 See infra notes 44-128 and accompanying text.
5° See infra notes 44-102 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 103-28 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 129-69 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 170-257 and accompanying text
4° See infra notes 263-85 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 286-94 and accompanying text.
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rent crisis.42 To alleviate this crisis, and to ensure the utility of
consent decrees as a means of settlement in the future, Section V
concludes by urging that the Massachusetts legislature pass an im-
portant sentencing reform bill currently before it. 4 '
I. SUPREME COURT HISTORY: CONSENT DECREES
A. Standards for Modification: The Swift Standard
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court held in United States
v. Swift & Co. that modification of consent decrees required a "clear
showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen condi-
tions."44 In Swift, an antitrust case, a group of meatpacking com-
panies who faced dissolution and criminal proceedings entered into
a consent decree in 1920 that enjoined them from maintaining a
monopoly." Specifically, the consent decree prohibited them from
engaging in the sale and transport of certain food products." Ten
years later, the defendants sought modification of the decree to
allow them to engage in the sale of these same food products. 47 The
company argued that the decree had not only served its purpose,
as they were no longer dominant forces in the industry, but had
become "oppressive."48
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Cardozo, denied their
request for modification." In so doing, Justice Cardozo expounded
on the nature of a consent decree. 5° First, he noted an important
distinction between decrees "that give protection to rights fully
'accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially im-
pervious to change, and those that involve the supervision of chang-
ing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative." 51
Having made the distinction, Justice Cardozo then rejected the
argument that either type of consent decree represents a contract. 52
Although he noted that what was agreed upon should not be "lightly
42 See infra notes 295-307 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 307-18 and accompanying text.
44 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
45 Id. at 110-11.
" Id. These food products included fish, vegetables, fruit and groceries. Id.
+ 7 Id. at 113.
"See id.
49 Id. at 120.
so See id. at 114- 15.
5L
 Id. at 114.
S2
 Id. at 115.
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undone,"55 he stated that a consent decree is to be treated as a
judicial act that the Court has inherent power to revoke or modify
if changing circumstances so dictate." Justice Cardozo maintained
that when a court interprets a consent decree, it should read the
consent "as directed toward events as they then were" but noted
that future revision should be granted if "necessary in adaption to
events to be."55
After determining the nature of a consent decree and estab-
lishing the Court's power to enforce it, Justice Cardozo elaborated
on a court's role when faced with a request for modification. 56 He
noted that changes occur in all businesses over time and cautioned
against the temptation to "reverse under the guise of readjusting." 57
The court's inquiry, he noted, was whether the changes since the
decree was entered have rendered the dangers the decree sought
to prevent "attenuated to a shadow."55 The Swift Court held that
modification of a consent decree was only appropriate under a
"clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions."59
B. Supreme Court Developments Regarding Consent Decrees After Swift
In the years following Swift, the Court clarified what constitutes
a "change in circumstance" that would allow for modification.° In
the 1961 case of System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, the Court held
that a subsequent change in the law that conflicts with the terms of
a consent decree justifies modification." In Wright, a railroad union
charged with violating the Railway Labor Act62 entered into a con-
sent decree with nonunion employees that prohibited the establish-
ment of a union shop, a restriction contained in the Railway Labor
Act at that time.65 Six years later, Congress amended the Railway
Labor Act to permit the establishment of a union shop." The union
" Id. at 120.
" Id. at 114.
" Id. at 115.
" See id. at 119.
57 Id.
55 Id.
59 Id.
"See System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961).
Id. at 651.
62 95 U.S.C. 1 152 (1988).
55 Wright, 364 U.S. 694-45.
54 Id. at 644.
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moved to modify the consent decree due to the change in law, but
the district and circuit courts denied the request.65
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, grant-
ing modification and citing Swift for the proposition that modifica-
tion is proper if the claimant can show significant changes in law or
fact have occurred that have rendered the consent decree "an in-
strument of wrong."66 The Court held that in this case the Railway
Act was the source of the consent decree, not the agreement of the
parties, and because the law governing the decree had changed to
conflict with the consent decree, the Court should grant modifica-
tion. 67
 The Court thus clarified Swift by noting that changed circum-
stances that may lead to modification include both changes in law
and changes in fact. 68 The Court also noted that a change in law,
as opposed to fact, was a particularly compelling reason to modify
a consent decree. 69
C. Inconsistencies That Remained
In the years since Swift, the Supreme Court has ruled inconsis-
tently in its treatment of both the nature and proper means of
interpreting a consent decree when faced with requests to modify
these decrees." Despite justice Cardozo's unwillingness to accept
consent decrees as contracts, the Court has since recognized that
"consent decrees are treated as contracts for some purposes but not
for others." Consequently, in certain circumstances the Court has
adopted a contractual approach to consent decrees that promotes
the finality of these agreements and assures that the parties bar-
65 Id. at 644-45.
66 Id. at 647 (citing United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932)).
67 Id. at 651.
" Id. at 647.
69
 Id. at 648.
7° Compare Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (test for modification
is whether proposed modification would thwart overall purpose of consent decree) with
United States v. Armour Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971) (refusing to look at overall purpose
of consent decree when considering modification).
Commentators have not responded favorably to the Court's inconsistent treatment of
the nature of consent decrees. See, e.g., Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models
Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. REV. 291, 300 (1988). In determining whether consent decrees
should be interpreted as contracts or as judicial acts, Mengler states, "the Court has said
nothing useful for the lower courts, unless one thinks providing a grab-bag of options is
useful." Id.
71
 United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 237 n.10 (1975).
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gained-for agreements will remain undisturbed. 72 On other occa-
sions, however, the Court has eschewed the contractual model cat-
egorically by refusing to examine the parties' expectations and
purposes for entering the decree. 73 An examination of two of the
most recent Supreme Court cases concerning consent decrees dem-
onstrates the Court's uncertainty about whether a reviewing court
should conduct a contractual analysis by attempting to ascertain the
purpose of a consent decree. 74
In the 1984 case of Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts,75 for
example, the Court held that the lower court committed reversible
error by modifying a desegregation consent decree to permit layoffs
of white firemen before black firemen when the layoffs of black
firemen were appropriate under the applicable provisions of Title
VII. 78 The Court gave two alternative reasons for rejecting the
attempted modification. 77 First, it noted that the decree in Stotts
provided for an affirmative action hiring plan but did not specify
that recently hired blacks should have protection from layoffs under
the city's seniority system.79 The Court stated that modification was
improper because the consent decree contained no mention of the
appropriate seniority system. 79 The Court supported this conclusion
by relying on an earlier case that strictly construed the terms of a
consent decree. 8° Second, the Court stated that the district court
could not enter a modification of the consent decree when the
modification would be in conflict with Title VII.'' The Court rea-
soned that this conclusion was appropriate given its previous hold-
73' See Local 93, lnt'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 521-22 (1986).
73 Wright, 364 U.S. at 651 ("[P]arties cannot, by giving each other consideration, purchase
from a court of equity a continuing injunction.").
74 Compare Local 93, 478 U.S. at 529 (Court looks to the purposes of the parties to
determine whether consent decree should be modified) with Firefighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,574-76 (1984) (Court interprets consent decree literally without
reference to the purposes of the parties).
75 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
78 Id. at 583. The city laid off black firefighters under its seniority system. Id. at 566.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee found that the layoffs
were not adopted with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Id. at 577. The Court
noted that Title VII protects seniority systems as long as they do not result in intentional
discrimination. Id. Thus, the Court held that this seniority system was bona fide under Title
VII. Id.
77 See id. at 574-76.
78 Id. at 575.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 574 (citing United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673,681-82 (1971)).
"I Id. at 576-77 n.9.
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ing in Wright that a consent decree should be modified when a
change in law brought the terms of a decree into conflict with the
statute pursuant to which the decree was entered. 82
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Stotts criticized the majority for
its strict construction of the consent decree and its purpose. 83 Justice
Blackmun noted that the parties negotiated the consent decree so
that the district court judge would have the power to effectuate its
purposes.84
 He described the future-oriented nature of these de-
crees, noting that they often rely on facts and assumptions that are
subject to change. 85
 Justice Blackmun concluded that it was unrea-
sonable for the majority to restrict the purpose of the decree to its
terms when the lower court was in the unique position to determine
the parties' intent and the purposes that shaped the decree."
Two years later, in Local 93 International Ass'n of Firefighters v.
Cleveland," the Court articulated a different view of consent de-
crees, holding that a court is not barred from entering a consent
decree that provides relief that the court could not order after trial
under the applicable statutory provision of Title VII. 88 In Local 93,
the Court approved a consent decree that required the use of quotas
to combat racial discrimination in the Cleveland Fire Department,
even though the applicable Title VII provision precluded the use
of such quotas as a form of post-trial relief." The union argued,
82 Id. Commentators have thus construed the Court's holding narrowly, to apply to
interpreting the scope of consent decrees for modification purposes only when they adversely
affect Title VII provisions. See ModOcation of Consent Decrees, supra note 6, at 1032 & n.79.
8' 467 U.S. at 609 (Blackmun. J., dissenting).
84 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8' See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In this way, Blackmun was implicitly distinguishing
from the situation in Swift and alluding to the words of Cardozo. See United States v. Swift
& Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). In Swift, Justice Cardozo distinguished between consent
decrees "that give protection to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be
substantially impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision of changing con-
duct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative." Id.
86 See Stotts, 467 U.S. at 609 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87
 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
as Id. at 515.
89 See id. at 513-15. The applicable Title VII provision is section 706(g), which states in
pertinent part:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an
individual as a member of the union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion
of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused em-
ployment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other
than discrimination on account of race, color, sex, or national origin or in
violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. I} 2000e-5(g) (1982).
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relying on Swift, that a consent decree is a judicial order that cannot
conflict with the plain language of Title VII."
The Court disagreed, favoring an interpretation of consent
decrees which acknowledged that these decrees have a contractual
aspect because they are often arrived at through extensive negoti-
ations between the parties. 9 ' in thus emphasizing the voluntary
nature of a consent decree, the Court maintained that it is the
agreement of the parties, rather than the underlying law, that cre-
ates the obligations contained in the decree. 92 The Court also high-
lighted the importance of consent decrees as a means of settling
disputes, thereby conserving judicial resources and avoiding the
costs of litigation."
In his dissent Justice Rehnquist faulted the majority's contrac-
tual interpretation of consent decrees as inconsistent with the pre-
vious decisions of Stotts and Wright. 94 Justice Rehnquist insisted that
the scope of a consent decree is not to be determined from the
obligations of the parties, but rather from "the federal statute pur-
suant to which the decree is entered."95 In viewing the consent
decree as a judicial act, the dissent found it to be an order of the
court that was in conflict with the plain language of Title VII."
Finally, the dissent noted its concern with the Court's inconsistent
treatment of the nature and scope of consent decrees, contending
that the Court in Local 93 merely repeated dissenting arguments
from Stotts that had not commanded a majority two years before. 97
Most recently, in the 1991 case of Board of Education v. Dowell, 98
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the approach taken in Local 93 to
interpreting decrees." In Dowell, the Court held that modification
of a desegregation decree was appropriate if the decree had accom-
9° Local 93, 478 U.S. at 518. Note that if the Court treated the consent decree specifically
as an "order," the decree would be in direct conflict with Title VII and, under Stotts, would
be an improper use of the Court's equitable power. See Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,576-77 n.9.
91 Local 93, 478 U.S. at 519,521-22.
" Id. at 522.
9' See id. at 528. The Court has noted the important federal interest in settlement in
other contexts. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717,732-34 (1986) (noting benefits of settlement
in civil rights litigation); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614,631 (1985) (noting federal interest in resolving disputes through alternative means).
" Local 93, 478 U.S. at 536-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 540 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99 See id. at 545 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9' Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
99 See id. at 636-37.
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plished its purpose.'°° The Court reversed the ruling of the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that had
denied modification.m Although Dowell involved a desegregation
decree rather than a consent decree, the Court, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, expressed its willingness to dis-
tinguish Swift and to look beyond the terms of the decree itself to
the purpose of the decree.'"
D. Federalism Problems with Consent Decrees in
Institutional Reform Litigation
In Dowell, the Court also commented on the federal courts'
equitable powers in granting injunctive relief against state or local
governments. 10" The Court in Dowell cautioned that when remedy-
ing constitutional violations, federal court decrees must directly
address the constitutional violation itself.'" This requirement stems
from the 1977 case of Milliken v. Bradley,'°5 where the Court held
that a federal court decree must be directed at eliminating a con-
dition that violates the constitution or "flows from such a viola-
tion. '9106 The petitioners in Milliken challenged a remedial order
designed to cure constitutional violations; the order required the
state to adopt certain educational programs as part of a desegre-
gation plan. 107 The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that
the remedial order exceeded constitutional requirements and up-
held the decree.'" The Court cautioned, however, that when courts
find a constitutional violation, they must tailor the remedy to cure
only that which violates the Constitution.'" This requirement that
federal courts limit injunctive decrees against state and local bodies
loo
101 Id. at 638.
102 Id. at 636-37.
103 See id. at 637. The Court in Dowell reasoned that if the purpose of the desegregation
decree was achieved, continuing the federal courts' jurisdiction would intrude on the discre-
tion of local school authorities, thus implicating "Iclonsiderations based on the allocation of
powers within our federal system." Id.
1 " See id.
1 " 933 U.S. 267 (1977).
'')0
 Id. at 282.
107 Id. at 279.
1 " a at 291.
' 09 Id. at 282. The Court said the remedy should be "tailored" to the violation to ensure
that federal courts do not intrude on states' administration of their laws. Id. at 280-81. This
concern is reflected in language nearly identical to Milliken in the 1992 case of Rufo v. Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
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to correcting specific constitutional violations reflects a concern that
federal courts recognize the "special delicacy . . . to be preserved
between federal equitable power and State administration of its own
Moreover, when judging the constitutionality of confinement
conditions in prisons, the Court has often warned that federal courts
should defer to legislative and executive discretion." The Court
expressly noted this deference as an important factor in Bell v.
Wolfish" 2 and Rhodes v. Chapman,'" holding that double bunking of
inmates is not a per se violation of either the Fifth Amendment or
the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution." 4 In both opinions,
the Court emphasized that federal courts have a duty to protect the
constitutional rights of inmates.' 15 The Court cautioned, however,
that the proper inquiry must be limited to clear violations of the
Constitution because "the wide range of judgment calls' that meet
constitutional and statutory requirements are confided to officials
outside of the Judicial Branch of Government."' 16
Finally, in recent years, the Supreme Court has displayed a
trend toward limiting judicial oversight of state prison affairs by
."° Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
500 (1974)). For the purposes of this Note, "federalism" is broadly described as the intrusion
of federal courts on the exercise of state power through the entry and enforcement of
consent decrees. For a general background discussion of federal court intrusion on state
Power, see Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere.. Federal Courts and State Power, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1485 (1987). For a discussion of how consent decrees in federal courts pose
potential intrusions on state power, see Effron, supra note 22, at 1808-20.
" 1 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-08 (1989) ("judiciary is 'ill
equipped' to deal with the difficult and delicate problems of prison management"); Turner
v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) ("Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertak-
ing that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are
peculiarly within the legislative and executive branches of government."); Procunier v. Mar-
tinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) ("problems of prisons in America are complex and
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree").
" 2 441 U.S. 520, 541 (1979).
11 ' 452 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1981).
114 In Bell, the inmates argued that double bunking of pretrial detainees violated their
Fifth Amendment right of due process of law. 441 U.S. at 530. The Court stated that the
proper inquiry was whether confinement conditions constituted punishment of the detainees.
Id. at 535. It held that although such a determination was fact-specific, double bunking was
not per se unconstitutional. Id. at 542-43.
In Rhodes, decided two years later, inmates at an Ohio state maximum security prison
contested double bunking of inmates as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 452 U.S. at
339. The Court held that double bunking in this case was not a constitutional violation. Id.
at 352.
13 See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352; Bell, 441 U.S. at 562.
16 Bell, 441 U.S. at 562.
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the federal courts." 7
 This trend has prompted some states to con-
front the problem of prison overcrowding directly.'" A number of
states have done so by reexamining and restructuring the organi-
zation of their criminal justice systems. "9 Typically, these states have
delegated control of their criminal justice systems to an independent
cornmission.' 2° A major goal of these commissions is to address the
problem of prison overcrowding through sentencing reform.' 2 '
Specifically, the commissions have restructured the states' sentenc-
ing guidelines to maintain balance between the correction capacity
and the sentencing practices.' 22
 In addition, the commissions have
alleviated prison overcrowding by establishing a range of interme-
diate sanctions, such as community penalty programs, as an alter-
native to incarceration. 123
In summary, the Supreme Court adhered to the strict standard
for modification of consent decrees enunciated in Swift prior to
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County jail. 124 Although certain changed
circumstances, notably changes in substantive law, have justified
modification, the Court has required the party moving for modifi-
cation to demonstrate that the decree is inequitable.' 25 The require-
ment that changed circumstances make the consent decree inequit-
able reflected the Court's view of the nature of consent decrees as
judicial acts, despite its recognition that a consent decree has con-
tractual aspects.' 26 Finally, the Court's emphasis on federalism con-
1 " See Keenan, supra note 25, at 507-08.
" a
 See Kathleen M. Bogan, Constructing Felony Sentencing Guidelines in an Already Crowded
State: Oregon Breaks New Ground, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 467, 469-75 (1990).
19 See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDE-
LINES 18-26 (1987) (examining experience of six states that have reexamined the organization
of their criminal justice system and the changes they have made).
1 2 0 Id. at 16.
121 See Bogan, supra note 118, at 469.
in See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After: Reflections on Dale
G. Parent's Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota's Sentencing Guide-
lines, 75 MINN. L. REV. 727, 733 (1991).
123 See, e.g., MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 15, at 40 (listing range of intermediate punish-
ments, from fines and community service orders to incarceration).
' 24 The Court did not specifically decline to follow Swift as the standard for modification
of consent decrees in institutional reform litigation before Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 757-58 (1992).
145 See, e.g., System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 652 (1961) (court will grant
modification when "a change in law or facts has made inequitable what was once equitable").
1 r6 See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932) (Court declares that
consent decree is a "judicial act"). But see Local 93, lnt'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501, 519, 522 (1986) (consent decrees "closely resemble contracts" because their
terms are negotiated by the parties).
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terns signaled the need for more flexibility to modify consent de-
crees.' 27
 In institutional reform litigation cases, and particularly in
prison reform litigation, the Court has demonstrated a trend toward
limiting federal court involvement in state and local affairs to pro-
tect state sovereignty.' 28
11. THE CIRCUIT COURT SEARCH FOR A PROPER STANDARD TO
MODIFY CONSENT DECREES IN PRISON REFORM LITIGATION
A. The Emergence of a More Flexible Standard
In the years following Swift, lower courts faced with requests
for modification of consent decrees employed a number of tech-
niques to justify modification despite the rigidity of the Swift stan-
dard.' 29 Common techniques included distinguishing Swift on its
facts,'" illustrating ambiguities in the language of Swift,'" and
drawing from subsequent Supreme Court decisions that interpreted
consent decrees broadly.'" Many of these decisions were prompted
by an array of commentary among scholars proposing that the strict
Swift standard should only apply to consent decrees between private
parties and that a more flexible standard was necessary when public
officials enter into consent decrees.'"
In the 1983 case of New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Carey,'" the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recognized the need for a more flexible standard to modify
consent decrees in institutional reform litigation.' 35 The court held
that modification was proper if the movant could show an unfore-
seen change in factual circumstances, that the movant had at-
tempted good faith compliance with the decree, and that modifi-
cation would not frustrate the original purpose of the decree.' 36 In
127 See Effron, supra note 22, at 1820.
122 See John P. Dwyer, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 CAL. L. Rev.
129, 135 (1987).
129 See generally Jost, supra note 6, at 1113-15 & n.84 (listing cases that have deviated
from Swift and techniques employed to do so).
132 See SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1978).
''' See Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1981) (en bane).
132 See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus. Inc., 418 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1969).
"3 See Chayes, supra note 3, at 1284; Cohn S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker:
Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA, L. Rev. 43, 63 (1979); Fiss, supra
note 3, at 49; Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV.
428, 436 (1977).
194 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983).
L33
 Id. at 970-71.
136
 Id. at 969-70.
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Carey, the New York State Association for Retarded Children filed
a class action suit in 1972 on behalf of mentally retarded children
alleging unconstitutional conditions at an overcrowded state school
for the mentally retarded.' 37 The parties settled the lawsuit through
a consent decree that specified procedures to reduce overcrowding
at the facility and ensure constitutional conditions.' 38 Specifically,
these procedures included relocation of mentally retarded students
to "community placement" facilities of fifteen beds or smaller.'" In
1981, administrators at the facility argued that compliance with the
decree was impossible due to the tight housing market in the city.
They moved to modify a provision of the consent decree to permit
relocation of students to larger facilities."°
Although the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York refused to allow modification, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reversed that decision."' Writing for
the court, Judge Friendly reasoned that modification of consent
decrees in institutional reform litigation demands more flexibility
because, unlike the decrees in Swift, these are often complex, on-
going decrees that must be fine-tuned as unforeseen impediments
arise.' 42 Additionally, Judge Friendly noted that unlike the situation
in Swift, compliance with these decrees may have adverse effects on
the public interest." 3 For these reasons, Judge Friendly concluded
that judges should have more flexibility to respond to changed
factual circumstances.'"
B. The Flexible Standard Applied in Prison Reform Litigation
In the decade after Carey, a growing number of circuit courts
recognized the need for a flexible standard to modify consent de-
crees in prison reform litigation. t45 Government officials moving for
' 97 Id. at 958.
131 1d.
139 Id. at 959.
'" Id. at 960, 965. The city moved to modify the consent decree pursuant to FED. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). Id. at 960.
141 Id. at 972.
142 See id. at 969-70.
142 See id. at 969.
144 M. at 971.
142 See Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1110 (6th Cir. 1989); Kozlowski v. Coughlin,
871 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1989); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295,
297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208, 215 (4th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 488
U.S. 897; Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1520 (11th Cir. 1984).
Two circuits have reorganized but not applied the flexible standard. See Ruiz v. Lynaugh,
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modification have argued that adherence to consent decrees which
set population caps and prohibit double ceiling is overly burden-
some given a rapid rise in inmate population over the last decade.'"
The United States Department of Justice recently urged courts to
exercise greater flexibility in modifying consent decrees in prison
reform litigation because population in state prisons now averages
115  percent of designed capacity.' 47 Prisoners contend, however,
that an overly flexible standard would frustrate the purpose of
settlement and undermine principles of finality, thereby threatening
the use and effectiveness of consent decrees.'" Circuit courts have
attempted to craft a standard that adequately preserves the integrity
of a consent decree while recognizing the need for flexibility in
prison reform litigation. 14" Even among the circuit courts that have
recognized a flexible standard, additional tensions exist; some cir-
cuits have further eased the restrictions on modification by focusing
only on whether modification furthers the purpose of the decree.' 5°
Others have adhered to Carey, demanding an additional showing
by the movant that the changed circumstances were unforeseen and
that the movant had attempted good faith compliance with the
decree.I 51
811 F.2d 856, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1987) (court recognizes flexible standard but reasons it is not
necessary to adopt it because lower court did not abuse its discretion in reaching result under
Swift); Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 1985) (court finds it unnecessary to adopt
flexible standard because even under Swift, the lower court's decision not to grant modifi-
cation must be reversed).
16 See Sharon Lafraniere, U.S. to Aid in Raising Limits on Inmates, BosToN GLOBE Jan. 16,
1992, at A8.
147 Id.
145 See Brief of Respondent at 19, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748
(1992) (No. 90-954); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Center For Dispute Settlement at 28-31.
Respondents also emphasize the strong federal interest in finality reflected in Supreme Court
precedent. See McClesky v. Zant, 111  S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991). Overemphasizing finality by
adhering strictly to the terms of a consent decree, however, would decrease settlement
incentives on the part of prison administrators who would refuse if inexorably bound by
terms that are potentially unachievable in future-oriented complex litigation. See Philadelphia
Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1120 (3d Cir. 1979).
19 See Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1110 (6th Cir. 1989) (courts must balance
interest in preserving consent decrees against public interest in effective administration of
prisons); Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 1989) (court must both preserve
goals of decree and respond flexibly to changed circumstances).
is° See, e.g., Badgley v. Santacroce, 853 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1988) (in granting modifi-
cation, court notes that guiding principle is whether modification furthers the purposes of
original decree).
151 See, e.g., Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295, 298-300 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (in denying modification, court found changed circumstances were not unforeseen
and that prison administrators did not attempt to comply in good faith with decree).
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Some circuits adopted a standard for modification of consent
decrees in prison reform litigation that is even more flexible than
Carey.' 52 In the 1989 case of Heath v. De Caurcy, 155 for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
modification should be granted when changed circumstances war-
rant fine-tuning of the decree to achieve its purpose.' 54 In Heath,
inmates at an Ohio jail negotiated a consent decree with prison
administrators in 1985 that set population caps and restricted dou-
ble bunking to a limited portion of the jail.' 55 Prison officials resisted
compliance with the decree for three years and moved for modifi-
cation to allow more double bunking in 1988.' 56 The court noted
that consent decrees in prison reform litigation require flexibility
and judicial discretion because of the public's strong interest in the
efficient operation of its jails.' 57 Affirming the district court's mod-
ification of the consent decree, the court stated that in applying this
standard to prison reform litigation, a trial court must balance the
interest in preserving the terms of the decree against the public
interest in having criminals complete their sentences.'"
The Heath court did not specifically require the movant to offer
compelling evidence of how changed factual circumstances ad-
versely affected their administration of the jail.' 59 Rather, the Heath
court indicated that the trial judge should have great discretion to
evaluate the history of the decree and the need for modification.' 6°
It is on this ground that the Heath court departed from the flexible
standard adopted by other circuits that have required the mavant to
prove to the court that changed circumstances justify modifica-
tion. 1 e' Moreover, the court in Heath did not require that the change
' 52 See, e.g., Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 3124 (4th Cir, 1991) (need for flexible
modification standard is "particularly acute" in the prison context); Kozlowski v. Coughlin,
871 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1989) ("flexibility should be the key to the solution" when
modification furthers purpose of decree in prison context).
155 888 F.2d 1 105 (6th Cir. 1989).
154 1d. at 1110.
"5 /d. at 1107.
155 Id. at 1107-08.
157 1d. at 1109.
L 55
 /d. at 1110.
155 See id.
15° See id.
161 See Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1328 (4th Cir. 1991) (modification granted because
state met burden by showing that unanticipated increase in prison population made compli-
ance with terms of decree impossible); Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 248-49 (2d Cir.
1989) (court denied modification because movant Commissioner of Correction failed to meet
burden by offering specific evidence that modification was necessary).
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in circumstances be unforeseen.' 62 Other circuit courts that recog-
nized a flexible standard have denied modification if the movant
could not demonstrate that changes in circumstance were unfore-
seen. 168 These courts have also adhered to Carey by requiring a
showing of attempted good faith compliance with the decree on the
part of the movant. 164 The court in Heath not only ignored the Carey
good faith requirement in its proposed standard for modification,
it dismissed it as irrelevant.' 65 The standard proposed in Heath
recognizes an active role for the federal trial judge to exercise
equitable authority and rejects a more contractual, hands-off ap-
proach that recognizes the terms of the agreement.' 66
Thus, lower courts have applied a flexible standard for consent
decree modification in institutional reform litigation, especially in
prison reform cases.' 67 The courts that have adopted a flexible
standard differed, however, in their application of certain factors
such as good faith compliance and foreseeability.' 68 The Supreme
Court accepted certiorari of Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail to
determine the appropriate standard for modification of consent
decrees in institutional reform litigation.' 69
III. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS: RUFO V. INMATES OF
SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court held in Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail"° that the Swift standard does not apply
162 Compare Heath, 888 F.2d at 1110 (holding that modification is appropriate if "circum-
stances and conditions have changed which warrant fine-tuning of the decree") with New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 969 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding that modification is proper when "unforeseen obstacles present themselves").
165 See Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1987).
16' See Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 300 (court denied modification, noting that city
failed to show good faith attempt to comply with the consent decree); Nelson v. Collins, 659
F.2d 420, 429 (4th Cir. 1981) (in granting modification request, court noted prison admin-
istrators attempted good faith compliance with terms of decree).
m See Heath, 888 F.2d at 1107 n.2.
1" See id, at 1109-10.
107 See Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1324 (4th Cir. 1991); Badgley v. Santacroce, 853
F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1988); Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1520 (11th Cir. 1984).
166 Heath, 888 F.2d at 1110 (holding that modification is appropriate if changed
circumstances warrant fine-tuning the decree to achieve its purpose) with Twelve John Does,
861 F.2d at 298 (holding that modification requires that changed circumstances are unfore-
seen and that movant has demonstrated attempted good faith compliance with the decree).
169 1 1 1 S. Ct. 950 (1991).
Po 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).
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to requests for modification of consent decrees in institutional re
form litigation."' The Court reasoned that the widespread use of
these future-oriented decrees justifies greater flexibility at the time
of modification because these decrees often affect the public's in-
terest in the efficient operation of its institutions. 172 The Court
therefore adopted a two-pronged flexible standard.'" Under this
standard, a party seeking modification must first establish significant
changed circumstances of law or fact that warrant modification.'"
Second, the proposed modification must be suitably tailored to the
changed circumstances. 175 The Court concluded that the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts erred because
it applied an improper standard to deny a request to modify a 1979
consent decree.'" The Court remanded the case for consideration
under its new standard.' 77
A. Fads and Procedural History of the Case
The litigation originated in 1971 on behalf of a class of inmates
at Suffolk County Jail, a county facility for pretrial detainees then
known as the "Charles Street Jail." 178 The plaintiffs alleged that
conditions of confinement at the Charles Street Jail violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.' 79 At the
conclusion of a six-day trial in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts in 1973, the district court held that
conditions at Charles Street Jail violated the detainees' rights to due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.'"
"' Id. at 758-59.
"2 1d.
"3 1d. at 760.
"4 Id.
'" Id.
' 78 Id. at 759.
17 Id. at 765.
"g Id. at 754. The class was certified under FED. R. Cm. P. 23(b)(2) on July 29, 1971.
Brief of Respondents at 1, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992)
(No. 90-954).
'" Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass. 1973).
is° Id. at 686. In his opinion, Judge Garrity graphically depicted the deplorable conditions
at the Charles Street Jail which he observed while touring the facility. Id. at 679-84. He
concluded:
Briefly, an inmate at Charles Street who merely stands accused spends from
two months to six months or longer awaiting trial. Each day he spends between
19 and 20 hours in a cell with another, strange and perhaps vicious man. When
both are in the cell, there is no room effectively to do anything else but sit or
lie on one's cot. The presence of a cell-mate eliminates any hope of privacy; an
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In its final judgment the court ordered the Suffolk County
Sheriff to stop double bunking immediately and to close the jail by
June 30, 1976. 181 No replacement facility was built, however, and
in 1977 the district court judge ordered the closing of the jail and
the appropriation of funds for a new facility. 182 Pending appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stayed the order
mandating appropriation of funds, but refused to stay the order
closing the facility. 183 Four days before the closing deadline, the
Sheriff filed a plan that the inmates and the district court approved
and that became the basis for a consent decree.'"
The district court approved the consent decree on May 7,
1979.'85 The consent decree itself stated its purpose was to "provide,
maintain and operate ... a suitable and constitutional jail for Suffolk
County pretrial detainees."88 Although the text of the consent de-
cree did not explicitly state that single ceiling was required, attached
to and incorporated into the decree was the approved 110-page
architectural plan providing for a new facility with single-occupancy
cells. 187 The plan also recommended a population cap of 309 pris-
oners, based upon the estimates of an independent survey that
projected a decrease in inmate population from 1979 to 1999.' 88
inmate may not use the toilet except in the presence of a stranger mere feet
away. He passes his continued hours in a dank, decrepit room, often smelling
of human excrement, usually in clothes which he cannot keep clean, and able
to see nothing outside the cell except parts of the catwalks and outside wall.
Id. at 687.
'"' Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 754.
Ja2 Id. at 755.
' 8' Brief of Respondents at 4, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748
(1992) (No. 90-954).
' 84 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 755. In approving the proposed plan, the district court noted
certain "critical" features of the plan, one of them being single cells. Id.
um Id.
'"" Id.
167 Id. The architectural plan specified that the new jail would have a total of 309 single-
occupancy rooms of 70 square feet. Id.
I RS Id. at 756. The Architectural Program projected that inmate population would decline
based on an independent survey. The survey projected the following populations by year:
1979: 245
1980: 243
1981: 241
1982: 239
1983: 238
1984: 236
1985-89: 232
1990-94: 226
1995-99: 216
Id. at 761 n.9.
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Finally, the plan called for construction of a new jail on the same
site by 1983. 189
By 1984, the city of Boston still had not begun construction of
a new jail.' 90 Inmate population continued to rise rather than fall
as originally predicted, and in order to comply with the population
caps contained in the agreed-upon architectural plan, the Sheriff
refused to accept any more pretrial detainees at the jail.' 9 ' The
Attorney General sued the Sheriff in state court seeking an order
to compel the Sheriff to accept all detainees delivered to him.' 92
The Sheriff filed his own action in state court seeking injunctive
relief against the Mayor and city council of Boston in order to
provide funding for a new jail.'" The state court ordered construc-
tion of the jail and the state legislature responded by appropriating
funds for the facility in 1985.' 94 In 1985, the district court approved
a joint request for modification of the decree to increase the capacity
of a new jail at a different site, provided single-cell occupancy was
maintained.' 96 Construction of the new jail on Nashua Street in
Boston began in September, 1987 and was completed in May,
1990.' 96
In July of 1989, Sheriff Robert Rufo moved for modification
of the consent decree in federal district court to allow double bunk-
ing of male detainees in 197 of the jail's 316 regular male housing
cells.' 97 The Sheriff offered two grounds to justify modification.' 98
First, he argued that Bell v. Wolfish constituted a change in law
' 89 Id. at 756.
190 Id.
"' See Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d 361, 362 (Mass. 1985).
'9Y id. at 363. Under Massachusetts General Laws, the Sheriff is under an obligation
to operate the jail and house detainees committed to him. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 268, § 20 (1990).
Chapter 268, § 20 states in pertinent part:
A jailer or officer who wilfully refuses to receive into his custody a prisoner
lawfully directed to be committed thereto upon conviction, upon a charge or
crime, or upon a lawful process, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than two years.
Id.
195 See Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d at 362.
1 " See id. at 366. A single justice for the state court ordered the city to construct a new
jail and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed this order. Id. The state legisla-
ture appropriated money for the construction of a new jail. See 1984 Mass. Acts 799.
I" Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 756 (1992). The number of
cells was subsequently increased to 453. Id.
196 Brief of Respondent at 14, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748
(1992) (No. 90-954).
197
	 112 S. Ct. at 756.
198
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regarding the constitutionality of double bunking, which warranted
modification.'" Second, he contended that a rapid and unexpected
rise in inmate population between 1985 and 1989 constituted a
change in operative facts that would justify modification. 20°
The district court denied the Sheriff's modification request,
holding that modification was not warranted under either the Swift
standard or a more flexible standard that looked to the purpose of
the decree. 2°' The district court reasoned that the Supreme Court's
decision in Bell did not directly overrule any legal basis of the
consent decree and could not be considered a change in law justi-
fying modification. 2°2 Regarding the alleged unforeseen rise in de-
tainee population, the court conceded that increases in jail popu-
lations are "difficult to predict and beyond the control of the
Sheriff."205 The court maintained, however, that the population
increases were "neither new nor unforeseen." 204 The court con-
cluded that modification was thus inappropriate under Swift. 205
The district court acknowledged that other courts employed a
more flexible standard regarding consent decree modification but
concluded that modification should also be denied even under this
standard. 206 The district court's interpretation of the flexible stan-
dard focused on whether modification would undermine a primary
purpose of the decree.207 The court determined that a primary
purpose of the decree was to provide for a single cell for each
detainee. 2" Thus, even under a flexible standard, the court denied
the Sheriff's request to modify the decree by double bunking be-
cause this would undermine a central purpose of the decree. 209 The
I" Id. Just one week after the parties signed the original consent decree in 1979, the
Supreme Court declared that double bunking was not per se unconstitutional. See Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979).
Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 756.
201
 Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 565 (0. Mass. 1990).
202
 Id. at 564.
21" Id,
2G4 Id.
tm Id. at 565. The court based its conclusion on the language of Swift, which requires
"clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions." United States
v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
Igg Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 565.
207 Id.
2" Id.
2°g Id. The court's reasoning emphasized that finality and certainty of consent decrees
must be preserved to ensure that they remain a valuable means of settlement in prison
reform litigation. Id. Although the court recognized that the public interest might be affected
by the release of some pretrial detainees, the court suggested that local officials appropriate
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district court's decision was affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion
by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 210 The
Sheriff filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court that was granted in 1991. 2 "
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court held in Rufo that the Swift standard for
modification of consent decrees is inappropriate in institutional
reform litigation. 212 The Court first established why a more flexible
standard is needed in this area. 213
 It then articulated its new stan-
dard that requires the movant to dêmonstrate that changed circum-
stances warrant modification and further requires the judge to tailor
the modification to the changed circumstances. 214
 Although all
members of the Court agreed upon the need for a new standard,
the concurrence and dissent expressed reservations over the re-
quirements for modification contained in the majority's new stan-
dard. 215
 This disagreement centers on whether, for purposes of
modification, a consent decree is to be treated as a contract or a
judicial act. 2 t 6
1. Establishing the Need for a Flexible Standard
To justify a more flexible standard for modification of consent
decrees in institutional reform litigation, the Rufo Court held that
Swift was limited to the context of that case, where the facts that
served as the basis of the consent decree were "impervious to
change."217
 Citing Court precedent that distinguished Swift on its
facts, 218
 the majority maintained that Swift did not preclude flexi-
bility or equitable judicial discretion. 219
 The Court noted the con-
textual difference of institutional reform litigation, in which consent
decrees are future-oriented orders that remain in place for long
more funds to accommodate the detainees and, thus, that the proper inquiry for the court
was limited to the legal requirements for modification. See id. at 566.
210 Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990).
2 " Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 111  S. Ct. 950 (1991).
212 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 758-60 (1992).
212 See infra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
214 See infra notes 225-45 and accompanying text.
212 See infra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.
212 See infra notes 252-58 and accompanying text.
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 758 (1992).
2 " See id. (citing United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968)).
212 See id.
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periods of time and thus are more subject to changing factual
circumstances. 22° The Court highlighted a further difference from
Swift, noting that consent decrees in institutional reform litigation
often affect the public's interest in the efficient administration of
its institutions."'
The Court concluded that given the unique nature of institu-
tional reform litigation and the widespread use of consent decrees
in this area in recent years, a flexible approach to modification is
necessary to further the goals of institutional reform litigation. 222
In recognizing the need for greater flexibility in this area, the Court
rejected the prisoners' principal argument that the utility of consent
decrees hinges on the parties' expectation that the negotiated set-
tlement will be fina1, 228 The Court noted that parties can still avoid
the costs of litigation by entering into consent decrees, and that
they have no guarantee that if they do litigate their claims, they
ultimately will win. 224
2. The First Prong: Changed Circumstances
After establishing the need for a more flexible standard, the
Court crafted a two-pronged test for future modifications in insti-
tutional reform litigation. 225 The first prong requires the movant to
establish that significant changes in fact or law warrant modifica-
tion.226 The Court determined that a movant may satisfy the burden
of establishing a significant change in fact in three ways. First,
modification may be warranted if changed factual conditions make
compliance with the decree "substantially more onerous." 227 Second,
modification is appropriate if the movant can show that the decree
is no longer workable due to unforeseen obstacles. 228 Finally, mod-
ification may be granted if the movant can demonstrate that, with-
out modification, the decree harms the public interest. 229
After listing the three bases for modification due to changed
factual circumstances, the Court added an important caveat. 28° The
220 See id.
221 See id. at 759.
222 See id. at 758.
225 See id. at 759.
224 See id. at 759-60.
225 See id. at 760.
220 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
429  Id.
020
 See id. at 760-61.
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Court noted that if the movant clearly anticipated the changed
circumstances at the time it entered the decree, it would have to
satisfy a heavier burden by demonstrating attempted good faith
compliance since the entry of the decree."' Although the district
court had stated that the rise in inmate population was not unfore-
seen, the majority downplayed this factual determination given con-
trary evidence in the record. 232 The Court remanded the case for
a further determination of whether the Sheriff actually foresaw a
rise in inmate population.233
The Court next stated three ways in which a change in law
could be the basis for modification. First, the Court maintained that
a decree must be modified if one of the parties' obligations later is
forbidden by federal law. 234 Second, the Court noted that modifi-
cation may be warranted if a subsequent change in law legalizes
what the decree had prohibited.235 Third, the Court stated that a
clarification of the law could also be a basis for modification. 238 The
Court cautioned, however, that a clarification of the law could not
result in modification unless the movant demonstrated that its rea-
son for entering the decree was based on a misunderstanding of
the governing law. 237 Accordingly, the Court declared that on re-
mand the district court should determine whether the movant ac-
tually misunderstood the law before Bell v. Wolfish as mandating
single celling. 238
"' See id. at 761.
232 See id. Specifically, the majority noted the estimated decrease in prison population
contained in the 1979 Architectural Program and the 1985 consent decree modification was
based on an "unanticipated increase in jail population." Id.
4" Id. The issue of foreseeability was hotly contested in this litigation. See Brief of
Respondents at 35, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (No. 90-
954) (urging that modification should only be allowed when change in facts is both "unfore-
seen and unforeseeable"). The majority specifically rejected Respondent's proposed standard.
See Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 760.
The dissent expressed dissatisfaction with the majority's subjective standard. Id. at 771
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent favored an objective standard which allows the district
court judge to determine whether the change in fact is "reasonably foreseeable." Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
255 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762.
235 See id. (citing System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650 (1961)).
256 See id. at 763.
235 See id. The Court created such a limited exception because it recognized that the
finality of consent decrees would be undermined if parties could litigate the merits of consent
decrees whenever a change in law occurred. See id.
233 Id. The dissent expressed dissatisfaction with the majority's view that a clarification
of law can be the basis for modification. See id. at 771 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent
reasoned that because Bell did not conflict with a term of the decree, it did not constitute a
change in law warranting modification. Id.
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3. The Second Prong: Tailoring the Modification
The second prong of the Court's new standard for modification
of consent decrees in institutional reform litigation requires the
district court to ensure that the proposed modification is "suitably
tailored to the changed circumstances."239 On one hand, the Court
cautioned that a proposed modification must neither perpetuate
future constitutional violations nor attempt to rewrite the consent
decree so that it meets minimum constitutional standards. 24° The
Court thus recognized that a consent decree is in some ways a
contractual undertaking between the parties"' that should be ac-
corded finality. 242
On the other hand, the Court noted that concerns about finality
must be weighed against both the public interest in safe and efficient
institutions and the deference federal courts should accord to local
administrators. 243 The majority instructed the district court, on re-
mand, to broaden its discretion and consider the financial con-
straints of local officials in tailoring the proposed modification. 244
The Court's emphasis on deference to local administrators echoes
earlier federalism concerns that federal courts exercise caution
when ordering injunctive relief against state and local entities. 245
C. Disagreement Over the New Standard and Ambiguities That Remain
Although the Court announced a new standard for modifica-
tion of consent decrees in institutional reform litigation, the decision
demonstrates continued concern about the nature of consent de-
crees. 246 Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, expressed dis-
2" Id. at 763.
2" See id. at 763-64. The Court seems to have borrowed this restriction on modification
requests in part from the standard proposed by the Respondents. See Brief of Respondents
at 37, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. CL 748 (1992) (No. 90-954).
" I See id. at 757 ("consent decree no doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and
thus in some respects is contractual in nature").
2" See id. at 764 ("consent decree is a final judgment that may be reopened only to the
extent that equity requires").
2" See id. at 764. The public interest and federalism concerns were set forth in detail by
Petitioner Rufo in his brief. See Brief of Petitioner Rufo at 23-27, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (No. 90-954).
2" See id. at 764 ("consent decree is a final judgment that may be reopened only to the
extent that equity requires").
2" Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 764 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 11 l S. Ct. 630,632 (1991)).
See supra notes 103-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of federalism concerns
expressed by the Court when injunctive relief is ordered by a federal court against a state
or local entity.
"6 See id. at 757.
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satisfaction with the new standard."' Justice O'Connor indicated
that modification of consent decrees should reflect their nature as
judicial acts, thereby precluding any rigid standard in favor of a
general inquiry as to whether the proposed modification is "equi-
table."248
 Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Black-
mun, conceded the need for a flexible standard in institutional
reform litigation.249 The dissent concluded, however, that the Sher-
iff's request for modification should still be denied. 25° The dissent
highlighted the contractual nature of these decrees and reasoned
that modification in this case was inappropriate because it would
not respect the bargained-for expectations of the parties. 25 '
Finally, the new standard does not require that modification be
in line with the overall purpose of the decree. 252
 Even those courts
that had adopted the most flexible standards required that the
proposed modification not undermine the basic purpose of the
decree.253
 This requirement recognized the contractual nature of
these decrees by ensuring that the essential agreement remain in-
violate. 254 The Rufo majority did not include the purpose require-
ment, reasoning that modification would be virtually impossible
247 See id. at 765 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
248 See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The concurrence thus favors a test that follows
Feb. R. Ctv. P. 60(b) and asks whether the proposed modification is equitable. Id.
The concurrence recognized that federalism concerns favor deference to local prison
administrators. See id. at 766 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Yet the concurrence maintained
that these concerns must yield to the equitable discretion of the judge, thus emphasizing the
nature of consent decrees as judicial acts. See id. The majority responded in a footnote that
federalism concerns are considered only after the need for modification is shown. Id. at 764
n.14.
249 See id. at 768 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250 1d. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent conceded that the public interest was a factor
in deciding whether to modify a decree. See id. at 772 n.7. However, it noted that mere
unpopularity with an order mandating expenditure of funds should not be the basis of
modification. Id.
251 See id. at 772-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252 See id. at 760-63.
"' See, e.g., Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1110 (6th Cir. 1989); Badgley v. San-
tacroce, 853 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1988).
254 See Heath, 888 F.2d at 1110 (modification will be upheld only if it does not upset basic
agreement between the parties).
It should be noted that all parties to the litigation, as well as the United States as Amicus
Curiae, included the requirement that a proposed modification not undermine the basic
purpose of the decree. See Brief For Respondents at 35, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (No. 90-954); Brief For Petitioner Sheriff Rufo at 32; Brief For
Petitioner Commissioner of Correction at 56; Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 8.
Commentators have also urged adoption of a standard that looks to the purpose of the
decree in institutional reform litigation. See Modification of Consent Decrees, supra note 6, at
1037.
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because alteration of any term in the decree could defeat the pur-
pose of the decree. 255 Both the concurrence and dissent disagreed
with the majority's conclusion on this issue. 256 The concurrence and
dissent acknowledged that consent decrees, like contracts, contain
certain critical terms that reflect the bargained-for agreement of
the parties and should remain undisturbed. 257
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF RUFO: ENSURING THE VIABILITY OF
CONSENT DECREES IN THE FUTURE
In the last two decades, parties have utilized consent decrees
to resolve environmental, school desegregation, housing discrimi-
nation, antitrust, prison and other institutional reform litigation.258
The advantages of using consent decrees to resolve such complex
litigation are numerous. Besides saving time and resources, parties
can avoid the adversarial nature of litigation and work together in
a spirit of cooperation to negotiate a meaningful solution to a com-
plex problem. 259 Once negotiated, the consent decree offers the
added advantage of judicial approval. By maintaining court juris-
diction over the consent decree, enforcement is facilitated; the need
to prove facts that would otherwise have to be shown to establish
the validity of an ordinary contract is unnecessary. 26° In addition,
prior to Rufo, parties welcomed judicial oversight of consent decrees
as an assurance that these often complex, future-oriented orders
could be fine-tuned to achieve their purpose. 261
Although the Court's new standard in Rufo for modification of
consent decrees in institutional reform litigation purports to respect
the finality of settlements negotiated in consent decrees, 262 an anal-
255 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762.
259 See id. at 767 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding majority conclusion "logically and
legally erroneous"); ed. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that majority conclusion "misses
the point"). The dissent prefaced its opinion by stating that it agreed with the Court's
endorsement of the flexible standard first articulated by Judge Friendly in New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 969 (2d Cir. 1983). Rufo, 112 S.
Ct. at 768 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority's standard, however, is different from the
standard in Carey because Carey required that modification not frustrate the original purpose
of the consent decree. See Carey, 706 F.2d at 969.
"2 See Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 767 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 773 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
2" See Amicus Curiae Brief of Center for Dispute Settlement at 5, Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (No. 90-954).
259 See Sturm, supra note 3, at 1446.
28° See Local 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 524 n.13 (1986).
261 See id. at 523-24 n.13.
262 See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
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ysis of the Court's standard reveals that it signals a grave departure
from previous standards in that it will make future modification
much easier. Particularly in the area of prison reform litigation, the
Court's new standard will likely threaten improvements in prison
conditions negotiated by inmates in recent years by allowing prison
administrators to escape too easily obligations previously embodied
in existing consent decrees. This Note argues that the nationwide
crisis in prison overcrowding will afford prison administrators seek-
ing modification of consent decrees that mandate population caps
with a way to attain modification under the Court's new standard.
Given that prison overcrowding poses a serious threat to the integ-
rity of consent decrees in prison reform litigation, this Note will
conclude by exploring what can be done to address the problem of
prison overcrowding. Specifically, this Note examines the problem
of prison overcrowding in Massachusetts and suggests steps that the
state should take to alleviate the acute crisis that currently exists.
A. The Supreme Court's New Flexible Standard Will Cause Modification
of Existing Consent Decrees in Prisons Across the Nation
The Court's decision in Rufo invites prison administrators
across the country to seek modification in the near future. 263 Ac-
cording to a 1990 report by the National Prison Project, the entire
prison systems of nine states are operating under consent decrees
or court orders.264 Forty-one states have at least one institution
under court order or consent decree. 265 The majority of these de-
crees impose restraints on overcrowding, largely through popula-
tion caps. 266 State prison administrators bound by these decrees will
probably seek modification after Rufo.
The administrators will contend that compliance with decrees
that set population caps is made onerous by the dramatic rise in
inmate population. In the last decade, the inmate population in
263 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Ease Ability to Have Court Pacts Modified, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 1992, at A14. Prison administrators have moved for modification in the wake of
Rufo, and courts have recognized that the new standard is more flexible. See Stone v. City
and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 855 (9th Cir. 1992); Diaz v. Romer, 961 F.2d
1508, 1511 (10th Cir. 1992); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 797 F. Supp 428
(1992). Commentators have also noted the flexibility of the new standard. See Russell W.
Gray, Note, Wilson v. Seiter; Defining the Components of and Proposing a Direction for Eighth
Amendment Prison Condition Law, 4l AM. U. L. REV. 1339, 1366-67 n.I53 (1992).
26I
 PRISON PROJECT, supra note 10, at 1.
Id. at 2.
"6 See PRISON SURVEY, supra note 10, at 6.
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America has doubled. 267 The prison population is rising at an an-
nual rate of thirteen percent, 2"8 or by approximately 2,650 inmates
per week. 269 With over 700,000 inmates already incarcerated in state
and federal facilities, 270 prison administrators are desperately seek-
ing ways to house the inmates committed to them. The current
crisis prompted the Justice Department to announce a shift in pol-
icy, stating that it would assist states seeking modification of consent
decrees that set population caps. 27 '
Under the first prong of the Rufo Court's new standard, the
movant must show that changed circumstances warrant modifica-
tion. 272 Prison administrators currently bound by consent decrees
that impose population caps can demonstrate that modification is
warranted in a number of ways. First, they can assert that the recent
rise in inmate population is a changed circumstance that makes
compliance "substantially more onerous." 2" Complying with con-
sent decrees that impose population caps is obviously made more
onerous when the number of persons committed to the custody of
prison officials swells. In the Rufo case itself, for example, to comply
with the consent decree, Suffolk County had to transfer pretrial
detainees to distant counties at a cost of close to one million dollars
a year. 274
Moreover, under the Court's new standard, modification is also
appropriate if the decree is detrimental to the public interest. 2" In
many cases like Rufo, the public interest is affected by the enormous
cost of compliance with consent decrees that taxpayers must bear. 276
Furthermore, Rufo also illustrates that adhering to population caps
267
	 John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenev, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse,
the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 557, 569 (1991) (citing M.
MAUER, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL RATES OF INCARCERA-
TION 2 (1990)).
262 Donald P. Lay, Our Justice System, So-Called, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990, at A19.
262 Stress Points in the State Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1990, § 1, at 17,
270
	 CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at I.
27' See LaFraniere, supra note 146, at A8.
272 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 760 (1992); see supra notes
226-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of what the Court considers changed factual
circumstances.
2" See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 760 (1992).
274 Brief of Petitioner Rufo at 9, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748
(1992) (No. 90-954).
2" Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 760.
270 See PRISON PROJECT, supra note 10, at 10-11. The report illustrates the high cost of
compliance with consent decrees in many states. Id. Compliance frequently costs the states
"hundreds of millions" of dollars. Id.
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in the face of a rising inmate population can directly endanger the
public interest. To comply with the decree in Rufo, the Sheriff had
to release potentially dangerous pretrial detainees to make room
for other inmates. 277
 It is hard to imagine a court that would not
consider the release of accused felons onto the streets as detrimental
to the public interest.
The second prong of the Court's new standard, which requires
that any modification be tailored to the changed circumstances, does
provide a necessary limitation on modification requests. 278 The
Court's recognition that principles of finality weigh against rewriting
consent decrees offers some assurance that modifications will re-
spect the negotiated settlements of the parties.279
 What the Court
gives with one hand, however, it takes away with the other. By
requiring a judge to consider the public interest and the financial
constraints of the states, the Court gives prison administrators seek-
ing modification in the 1990s the distinct advantage. 280 With the
current economic strife that most states are facing, prison admin-
istrators can point to the exorbitant cost of compliance to justify
modification. Furthermore, aside from the public interest concerns
already mentioned, there is a current national desire to reduce
violent crime and rampant drug use. 281
 This public interest from
constituents has influenced state legislatures to enact "get tough"
crime statutes that often carry with them mandatory sentences. 282
Courts tailoring modification requests to changed circumstances will
undoubtedly be aware of these mandatory sentencing laws and the
substantial contribution they have made to the problem of over-
crowding. These courts will likely grant modification and dissolve
population caps to make room for the flood of inmates pouring in
due to publicly supported anti-crime legislation. Thus, although the
277 See Brief of Petitioner Rufo at 39, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 1l2 S. Ct.
748 (1992) (No. 90-954). This is not an isolated example. Other courts have granted modi-
fication to protect the public interest in similar factual circumstances. See Duran v. Elrod,
760 F.2d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 1985) (court granted modification of consent decree because
denying modification would lead to release of 500 accused felons).
276 See Greenhouse, supra note 263, at A14.
279 See Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 763-64.
288 The concurrence expressed dissatisfaction with the requirement that courts defer to
local prison administrators, noting that "deference to one of the parties to a lawsuit is usually
not the surest path to equity." Id. at 767 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"' See Austin D. Sarat, Beyond Rehabilitation, in ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 103, 103-04
(Fred E. Baumann & Kenneth M. Jensen eds., 1989).
282 See generally ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 4.5, at 80-82 (2d ed. 1991).
By the late 1980s virtually every state legislature responded to public demand for crime
control by enacting mandatory incarceration laws. Id.
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second prong of the Court's standard offers a perfunctory nod
toward the contractual principle of finality, its emphasis on defer-
ence to local officials and the public interest suggests, in the prison
context, a significant move toward judicial discretion and modifi-
cation with a freer hand.
Furthermore, the Court's standard makes modification easier
by not requiring any initial showing of attempted good faith com-
pliance with the terms of the decree. 283 Under the Court's standard,
the movant's lack of good faith is arguably not even a factor unless
the party opposing modification can show that changed factual
circumstances were actually considered by the movant at the time
the decree was entered.284 This determination requires proof of the
parties' subjective intent at the time of entering the decree, which
will be difficult to demonstrate. In the past the Court has avoided
a time-consuming inquiry into the subjective motivations of public
officials because it is impractical and difficult to prove. 285 Inmates
opposed to modification requests in the future will undoubtedly
face similar problems proving the subjective knowledge of the mov-
ant.
B. The Court's Standard Will Lead to Inequitable Results and Will
Threaten the Utility of Consent Decrees in the Future
More importantly, the Court's failure to include a good faith
requirement will lead to inequitable results. Assume, for example,
that a prison administrator agrees to a consent decree to avoid the
threat of litigation. The administrator then immediately resists com-
pliance and exceeds agreed-upon population caps. When the in-
mates threaten to enforce the terms of the decree, the prison ad-
ministrator simply moves for modification, stating that the rise in
inmate population has made compliance substantially more oner-
ous. Under the Court's new standard for modification of consent
decrees in Rufo, the prison administrator's lack of good faith ar-
guably might not even factor into the decision of the lower court. 286
283 See Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 760-61. The lower courts recognized that the workability and
continued use of consent decrees would be undermined without a prerequisite showing of
attempted good faith. See supra note 164 and accompanying text; see also Alliance to End
Repression v. Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1020 (7th Cir. 1984) (en bane) ("[Wlho will make a
binding agreement with a party that is free to walk away from an agreement whenever it
begins to pinch?").
284 See Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 760-61.
"5 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982).
Tag This is not a far-fetched scenario. Rather, it is exactly what occurred in Heath v. De
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Perhaps the most damaging blow to the integrity of consent
decrees in the wake of Rufo is the Court's refusal to include consid-
eration of the basic purpose of the consent decree as part of its new
standard for modification. 287 Not allowing a judge faced with a
request for modification to determine whether the modification
accords with the purpose of the decree undermines the contractual
nature of consent decrees and deprives the party opposed to mod-
ification the benefit of its bargain. 288 Even the lower courts that had
adopted the most flexible standards for modification of consent
decrees had recognized the purpose requirement as a necessary
assurance that these agreements would have some finality. 289 After
Rufo, parties contemplating consent decrees as a means of settle-
ment must proceed carefully, because the Rufo standard offers no
guarantee that even their most basic expectations will be protected.
In the last twenty years, inmates nationwide have utilized con-
sent decrees to facilitate settlement and, more importantly, to realize
improvement of confinement conditions. Unfortunately, the na-
tion's current crisis in prison overcrowding and the Supreme
Court's adoption of a more flexible standard for modification of
consent decrees combine to threaten these improvements. Countless
existing decrees will likely be modified. Perhaps more disturbing is
that if the prison overcrowding crisis continues, this will undermine
the utility of consent decrees as a means of settlement in the future.
The incentive to forego litigation and enter a consent decree is
diminished if the bargained-for agreements embodied in the terms
of the decree can be freely modified. 29°
As long as the Court's new test for modification of institutional
reform consent decrees remains in place, consent decrees can only
continue to serve as effective alternatives to litigation if the problem
of prison overcrowding is addressed. Population caps and clauses
mandating single ceiling will not be enforced by the courts if the
flow of inmates committed to prison officials is not stemmed. An
obvious measure to alleviate prison overcrowding is appropriation
of more funds to construct new prison facilities. Commentators,
Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1107 & n.7 (6th Cir. 1989). See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Heath.
28"
	 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762.
288 See id. at 773 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
288 See, e.g., Heath, 888 F.2d at 1110; Badgley v. Santacroce, 853 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir.
1988).
290 See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Center For Dispute Settlement at 22, Rufo v. Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (No. 90-954).
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however, have questioned the efficacy of this solution because prison
population tends to increase as fast as prison space. 29 ' Other com-
mentators, estimating that close to one-half of all prison inmates
are there on drug-related charges, have urged that legalization of
drugs would solve the prison overcrowding crisis. 292
A discussion of the validity of these proposals is beyond the
scope of this Note. The Rufo decision can be seen, however, as a
continuation of a recent Supreme Court trend toward restricting
federal court oversight of institutional reform, especially prison
reform.293 This signals the need for state legislatures to address the
problem of prison overcrowding directly, as many have done. 294
This Note will conclude with an examination of the current prison
overcrowding crisis in Massachusetts and will suggest steps that the
state legislature should take to alleviate the problem.
V. THE MASSACHUSETTS MORASS: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN
NEED OF REFORM
This is a case with no satisfactory outcome. The new jail is simply
too small. Someone has to suffer, and it is not likely to be the
government officials responsible for underestimating the inmate
population and delaying the construction of the jail. Instead, it
is likely to be either the inmates of Suffolk County, who will be
double celled in an institution designed for single ceiling; the
inmates in counties not yet subject to court supervision, who will
be double celled with the inmates transferred from Suffolk County;
or members of the public, who may be the victims of crimes
committed by the inmates the county is forced to release in order
to comply with the consent decree. 295
-Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail
" I See Bradford J. Tribble, Note, Prison Overcrowding in Alaska; A Legislative Response to
the Cleary Settlement, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 155, 166 (1991).
m See David Elkins, Note, Drug Legalization: Cost Effective and Morally Permissible, 32 B.C.
L. REV. 575, 579 (1991).
" See supra note 117 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's
restriction of prison reform in recent years. See also Dwyer, supra note 128, at 139 (noting
Supreme Court trend of protecting state sovereignty by restricting institutional reform liti-
gation).
294 See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text for description of some states' efforts
to address the problems of prison overcrowding.
"s Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 766-67 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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The problem of prison overcrowding in Massachusetts can be
attributed in large part to an utter lack of communication between
the three branches of government. In July of 1990, the Boston Bar
Association and the Criminal Justice Foundation convened the Task
Force on Justice to address problems of public safety in the Mas-
sachusetts criminal justice system. 298 The Task Force concluded that
the criminal justice system in Massachusetts was "not a 'system' at
all, but rather a myriad of unconnected bureaucracies lacking
shared goals, adequate resources, or clear policy direction."297 The
Task Force discovered a prison system operating at 159 percent of
capacity, with no hope for any slowdown in the growth rate. 298
 The
state's prisons are so congested that inmates who have served only
a fraction of their sentences must be released annually. 299 Despite
spending over one billion dollars in the last decade to improve
correctional facilities and increase capacity by 62 percent, the Com-
monwealth's prison system remains one of the most crowded in the
nation."'" One cannot help but wonder why this is so.
The reason is surprisingly simple and by no means limited to
the state of Massachusetts. In an interview, Sheriff Robert Rufo
noted that the Massachusetts state legislature has recently passed
numerous "get tough on crime statutes" that carry mandatory
prison sentencing provisions for drunk driving and drug trafficking
violations."' These statutes are an understandable response to po-
litical pressure from constituents seeking to combat drunk driving
and the drug crisis. As Sheriff Rufo observed, however, "with one
swipe of the legislature's pen, the prison population can go through
the roof."302
The "get-tough" legislation passed by Massachusetts is harmful
because it does not carry with it the necessary commitment of re-
496 See BOSTON BAR ASS'N & CRIME AND JUSTICE FOUND., THE CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS
AND SENTENCING IN MASSACHUSETTS I (1991) [hereinafter BOSTON BAR ASS'NJ.
29' Id. at 2.
e" See id. at 13-14.
299 See id. at 2.
"3 /d. at 5.
NH Interview with Robert C. Rufo, Sheriff of Suffolk County, in Boston, Mass. ( Jan. 8,
1992). For examples of the Massachusetts "get-tough" legislation, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 94C, § 32E (West 1989) amended by MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, ft 32E (West 1992)
(statute providing for mandatory prison sentencing for drug traffickers amended in 1988 by
lowering amount of cocaine or heroin in person's possession to be considered a drug trafficker
from 28 to 14 grains); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 90 * 24 (1990) (state legislature providing mandatory
prison sentences for second drunk driving offense).
3D2 Interview with Robert C. Rufo, supra note 301.
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sources to the courts, the prosecutors or the corrections system.
Furthermore, it is irresponsible to pass such legislation when official
reports indicate that in reality the crime rate in Massachusetts has
actually declined 16 percent since 1980. 3°3 Studies reveal that these
mandatory sentencing laws contribute significantly to the problem
of prison overcrowding nationwide.3°4 These laws are also the most
costly of all sentencing initiatives. 303 Moreover, they do not seem to
have any noticeable deterrent effect. 306 Judges, prosecutors and
prison officials all criticize mandatory sentencing laws as costly and
ineffective. 3°7 The first step that the Commonwealth can take to
alleviate prison overcrowding is to repeal the mandatory sentencing
laws.
The second step that Massachusetts can take is to follow the
lead of other states such as Minnesota and Oregon that have ad-
dressed prison overcrowding through sentencing reform.3°° The
report of the Task Force on Justice contained sentencing reform
proposals similar to those of other states. 3°9 Massachusetts Attorney
General Scott Harshbarger drafted the proposals into legislation
and presented a bill to the Massachusetts Senate this year."' The
bill suggests that the legislature establish an independent commis-
sion to promulgate sentencing guidelines that the courts in Massa-
chusetts shall use. 3 " A primary goal of the commission would be to
ensure that the Massachusetts prison population would not exceed
the capacity of its prisons.312 Specifically, the commission would
develop and evaluate intermediate sanctions as a sentencing op-
tion.3"
The Massachusetts legislature should pass this bill. The expe-
rience of other states demonstrates that the establishment of an
independent commission is a particularly effective way to address
'' See BOSTON BAR Ass'N, supra note 296, at 10.
'' See CAMPBELL, supra note 282, at 83.
3°5 Id.
"6 Id.
"7 Id. at 81-83.
"See generally Bogan, supra note 118, at 467 (describing Oregon's recent efforts at
sentencing reform); Erase, supra note 122, at 727 (describing Minnesota's sentencing reform).
"See BOSTON BAR Ass'N, supra note 296, at 2-5.
310 See S. 118 1992 Regular Session, (1992).
311 See id. NI 2(a), 2(c)(8).
312 See id.	 1(a)(4).
313 See id. 1(a)(5). Included in the list of possible intermediate sanctions are the follow-
ing: standard probation; intensive supervision probation; community service; home confine-
ment; day reporting; residential programming; restitution; and means-based fines. Id. I 1(c).
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prison overcrowding because the commission has the time and nec-
essary expertise to reform sentencing policy that the legislature
lacks. 314 Moreover, the commission is insulated from political pres-
sures and can avoid the need to satisfy constituents. 3  The legisla-
tures have demonstrated through the enactment of mandatory sen-
tencing laws that they are often motivated by politics of crime
control. 3 " An independent commission could impartially coordi-
nate the state's sentencing and corrections functions to maintain
balance between prison capacity and sentencing practices.
Finally, the independent commission could explore and even-
tually implement the use of intermediate sanctions. These include
community-based penalty programs, economic penalties, such as
day fines, and lesser restrictions on liberty, such as home confine-
ment or day reporting. 317 Former United States Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh recently supported the use of intermediate
sanctions, stating that "when criminal justice systems nationwide are
bursting at the seams, intermediate punishments can provide the
means by which we can hold offenders accountable for their illegal
actions, and achieve our goal of increasing public safety." 3 "
Consent decrees will not remain a viable settlement option in
prison reform litigation unless states address the problem of prison
overcrowding. Prison administrators cannot abide by restrictive
population caps mandated by consent decrees and simultaneously
accommodate the soaring number of inmates committed to them
through mandatory sentencing laws. If consent decrees are to be
used in the future to improve prison conditions, state legislatures
must take steps to arrest the prison overcrowding crisis. Massachu-
setts should address this problem by repealing its mandatory sen-
tencing laws and passing the sentencing reform bill pending in the
legislature.
VI. CONCLUSION
Consent decrees are a very important alternative means of
resolving disputes and effectuating remedial change in institutional
reform litigation. Unlike consent decrees in private law litigation,
however, these decrees are often very complex, future-oriented
514 See Frase, supra note 122, at 729-30.
]16 See id.
516 See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
511 See BOSTON BAR ASSN, supra note 296, at 21-24.
514 Id. at 22,
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orders that affect the public's interest in the efficient operation of
its institutions. The Supreme Court's adoption in Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County jail of a new standard for modification of consent
decrees in this area reflects an awareness that more flexibility is
needed to consider both the public interest and the predicament of
local institutional administrators. Nevertheless, the opinion also re-
veals the Court's continued struggle to determine the nature of a
consent decree. While recognizing the hybrid nature of consent
decrees as part contract and part judicial act, the Rufo Court deci-
sion signals a move away from a contractual view of consent decrees
in institutional reform litigation. This threatens to undermine the
finality of these negotiated settlements by depriving one party of its
bargained-for expectations.
After Rufo, increased requests for modification of consent de-
crees currently in place in a majority of state prisons is likely. Inmate
populations across the country have risen dramatically during the
past decade, and local prison administrators will seek to escape
consent decree provisions that mandate population caps and pro-
hibit double bunking in order to accommodate more inmates. Fed-
eral judges applying the new standard will probably grant modifi-
cation more often if the prison overcrowding crisis continues.
Therefore, if consent decrees are to continue as a viable means of
avoiding protracted and costly litigation in the context of prison
reform, it is essential that government officials combat the problem
of prison overcrowding. The Rufo decision reflects a judicial re-
sponse to a problem it is not equipped to solve without concurrent
efforts by the legislative and executive branches.
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